

Zgodovinski časopis

HISTORICAL REVIEW

ZČ | Ljubljana | 78 | 2024 | št. 1-2 (169) | str. 1–262



Rajko Bratož, *Marcellinus von Dalmatien und die Frage der Verselbständigung Dalmatiens zu seiner Zeit* • Svit Komel, *Vpliv katastrskih popisov na izvedbo zemljiške odveze na Kranjskem* • Miha Zobec, *Tomajski posestnik in politik Anton Černe (1813-1891) med Dunajem in izvorno skupnostjo: pogled na življenjsko pot vaškega mogotca* • Tomasz Jacek Lis, *Austrian-Croat relations in Habsburg Bosnia and Herzegovina* • Žarko Leković, *An overview of Political, Diplomatic and Social Affairs in Montenegro on the Eve of the First World War* • Biljana Ristić, *Vojaške bolnišnice in pokopališče v Škofji Loki* • Oto Luthar, *Poletje s Tukididom. O nekaterih aktualnih vprašanjih zgodovinopisja*

Zgodovinski časopis

HISTORICAL REVIEW

ZČ | Ljubljana | 78 | 2024 | št. 1-2 (169) | str. 1-262



Izdaja
ZVEZA ZGODOVINSKIH DRUŠTEV SLOVENIJE
Ljubljana

GLASILO ZVEZE ZGODOVINSKIH DRUŠTEV SLOVENIJE

Mednarodni uredniški odbor: dr. Kornelija Ajlec (SI), dr. Tina Bahovec (SI),
dr. Bojan Balkovec (SI) (tehnični urednik), dr. Rajko Bratož (SI),
dr. Ernst Bruckmüller (AT), dr. Liliana Ferrari (IT), dr. Ivo Goldstein (HR),
dr. Žarko Lazarevič (SI), dr. Dušan Mlacović (SI) (namestnik odgovornega
urednika), dr. Božo Repe (SI), dr. Franc Rozman (SI), Janez Stergar (SI),
dr. Imre Szilágyi (H), dr. Peter Štih (SI) (odgovorni urednik), dr. Marta
Verginella (SI), dr. Peter Vodopivec (SI), dr. Marija Wakounig (AT)

Za vsebino prispevkov so odgovorni avtorji, prav tako morajo poskrbeti za avtorske pravice za objavljeno slikovno in drugo gradivo, v kolikor je to potrebno. Ponatis člankov in slik je mogoč samo z dovoljenjem uredništva in navedbo vira.



Redakcija tega zvezka je bila zaključena 10. april 2024.

Oblikovanje in oprema: Vesna Vidmar

Sedež uredništva in uprave: Oddelek za zgodovino Filozofske fakultete v Ljubljani,
Aškerčeva 2, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenija, tel.: (01) 241-1200,
e-pošta: info@zgodovinskicasopis.si; <http://www.zgodovinskicasopis.si>

Letna naročnina: za leto/letnik 2024: za nečlane in zavode 32 €, za društvene člane 24 €,
za društvene člane – upokoјence 18 €, za društvene člane – študente 12 €.
Cena tega zvezka v prosti prodaji je 16 € (z vključenim DDV).

Naročnina za tujino znaša za ustanove 45 €, za posameznike 35 €
in za študente 25 €.

Plačuje se na transakcijski račun: SI 56020 1 000 12083935
Zveza Zgodovinskih društev Slovenije, Aškerčeva 2, 1000 Ljubljana,
Slovenija
Nova Ljubljanska banka, d.d., Trg Republike 2, 1520 Ljubljana LJBAS12X

Sofinancirajo: Publikacija izhaja s finančno pomočjo Javne agencije za raziskovalno
dejavnost RS

Prelom: ABO grafika d.o.o. – zanjo Igor Kogelnik

Tisk: ABO grafika d.o.o., Ljubljana, maj 2024

Naklada: 500 izvodov

Zgodovinski časopis je evidentiran v naslednjih mednarodnih podatkovnih
bazah: Scopus, European Reference Index for the Humanities (ERIH),
Historical Abstracts, International Bibliography of the Social Sciences,
ABC CLIO, America: History and Life, Bibliography of the History of Art,
Ulrich's Periodicals Directory, Russian Academy of Sciences Bibliographies.

<http://www.zgodovinskicasopis.si>
info@zgodovinskicasopis.si



ISSN 0350-5774	
UDK	949.712(05)
UDC	

BULLETIN OF THE HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION OF SLOVENIA (HAS)

International Editorial Board: Kornelija Ajlec, PhD, (SI), Tina Bahovec, PhD, (SI), Bojan Balkovec, PhD, (SI) (Technical Editor), Rajko Bratož, PhD, (SI), Ernst Bruckmüller, PhD, (AT), Liliana Ferrari, PhD, (IT), Ivo Goldstein, PhD, (HR), Žarko Lazarević, PhD, (SI), Dušan Mlacović, PhD, (SI) (Deputy Editor-in-Charge), Božo Repe, PhD, (SI), Franc Rozman, PhD, (SI), Janez Stergar (SI), Imre Szilágyi, PhD, (H), Peter Štih, PhD, (SI) (Editor-in-Chief), Marta Verginella, PhD, (SI), Peter Vodopivec, PhD, (SI), Marija Wakounig, PhD, (AT)

The authors are responsible for the contents of their articles, they must also secure copyrights for the published photographs and figures when necessary. Reprints of articles, photographs, and graphic material are only allowed with explicit permission of the editorial office and must be cited as sources.



The editing of this issue was completed on April 10, 2024.

Design: Vesna Vidmar

Headquarters and Mailing Address: Oddelek za zgodovino Filozofske fakultete v Ljubljani, Aškerčeva 2, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, phone: +386 1 241-1200, e-mail: info@zgodovinskiasopis.si; <http://www.zgodovinskiasopis.si>

Annual Subscription Fee (for 2024): non-members and institutions 32 €, HAS members 24 €, retired HAS members 18 €, student HAS members 12 €.

Price: 16 € (VAT included).

Subscription Fee: foreign institutions 45 €, individual subscription 35 €, student subscription 25 €
Transaction Account Number: SI 56020 1 000 12083935
Zveza Zgodovinskih društev Slovenije, Aškerčeva 2, 1000 Ljubljana,
Nova Ljubljanska banka, d.d., Trg Republike 2,
1520 Ljubljana LJBASI2X

Co-Financed by: Slovenian Research Agency

Printed by: ABO grafika d.o.o., Ljubljana, May 2024

Print Run: 500 copies

Historical Review is included in the following international databases: Scopus, European Reference Index for the Humanities (ERIH), Historical Abstracts, International Bibliography of the Social Sciences, ABC CLIO, America: History and Life, Bibliography of the History of Art, Ulrich's Periodicals Directory, Russian Academy of Sciences Bibliographies.

<http://www.zgodovinskiasopis.si>
info@zgodovinskiasopis.si



ISSN 0350-5774	
UDK	949.712(05)
UDC	

KAZALO – CONTENTS

Razprave – Studies

- Rajko **Bratož**, Marcellinus von Dalmatien und die Frage der
Verselbständigung Dalmatiens zu seiner Zeit8–29
Marcelin iz Dalmacije in vprašanje osamosvojitve
Dalmacije v njegovem času
- Svit **Komel**, Vpliv katastrskih popisov na izvedbo zemljiške
odveze na Kranjskem30–99
Land surveyor's relief: The influence of cadastral surveys
on the execution of the land relief in Carniola
- Miha **Zobec**, Tomajski posestnik in politik Anton Černe (1813-1891)
med Dunajem in izvorno skupnostjo: pogled na življenjsko pot
vaškega mogotca 100–119
Tomaj landowner and politician Anton Černe (1813-1891)
between Vienna and his community of origin:
a close-up look at the life of a village tycoon
- Tomasz **Jacek Lis**, Austrian-Croat relations in Habsburg
Bosnia and Herzegovina 120–147
Avstrijsko-hrvaški odnosi v habsburški Bosni in Hercegovini
- Žarko **Leković**, An overview of Political, Diplomatic and Social
Affairs in Montenegro on the Eve of the First World War 148–166
Pregled političnih, diplomatskih in družbenih razmer
v Črni gori na predvečer prve svetovne vojne
- Biljana **Ristić**, Vojaške bolnišnice in pokopališče v Škofji Loki 168–190
The Field Hospitals and Military Cemetery in Škofja Loka
- Oto **Luthar**, Poletje s Tukididom. O nekaterih aktualnih
vprašanjih zgodovinarstva 192–215
Summer with Thucydides. On Some Current
Questions of Historiography

Jubileji – Anniversaries

Osemdeset let prof. dr. Janka Prunka (Jure Perovšek)	218–221
Janko Prunk – An Octogenerian	
Salvator Žitko – osemdesetletnik (Dušan Mlacović)	222–224
Salvator Žiško – An Octogenerian	
Metod Benedik – osemdesetletnik (Bogdan Kolar)	225–228
Metod Benedik – An Octogenerian	

V spomin – In memoriam

Ana Benedetič (Tatjana Dekleva)	230–232
Miloš Fon (Rajko Bratož)	233

Kongresi in simpoziji – Congresses, Symposia

Poletna šola Okoljska zgodovina in historična ekologija Dinarskega krasa (Ljubljana, 25.–30. september 2023) (Brina Kotar)	236–238
Summer School Environmental History and Historical Ecology of the Dinaric Karst	

Ocene in poročila – Reviews and Reports

Žarko Lazarevič, Marta Rendla, Janja Sedlaček, Zgodovina zadružništva v Sloveniji (1856–1992) (Bojan Balkovec)	240–242
Ana Cergol Paradiž, »Bela kuga«: ilegalni abortusi in zmanjševanje rodnosti na Slovenskem v obdobju med obema vojnama (Irena Selišnik)	243–245
Daniel Siter, Rogaška Slatina pod kljukastim križem: zdravilišče med okupacijo 1941–1945 (Tomaž Teropšič)	246–248
Robovi, stičišča in utopije prijateljstva. Spregledane kulturne izmenjave v senci politike (Žiga Smolič)	249–253
Julie Rak, False Summit: Gender in Mountaineering Nonfiction (Julija Šuligoj)	254–258

* * *

Navodila avtorjem prispevkov za Zgodovinski časopis	259–262
Instructions for Authors	

Razprave

Žarko Leković

An Overview of Political, Diplomatic and Social Affairs in Montenegro on the Eve of the First World War

LEKOVIĆ Žarko, PhD, senior research associate, Univerzitet Crne Gore, Istorijski institut, MN-81000 Podgorica, Bulevar revolucije br. 5, zarkol@ucg.ac.me

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5510-8877>

An Overview of Political, Diplomatic and Social Affairs in Montenegro on the Eve of the First World War

Zgodovinski časopis (Historical Review), Ljubljana 78/2024 (169), No. 1–2, pp 148-166, 56 notes.

Language: En. (Sn., En., Sn.)

The military circles of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy knew Montenegro was exhausted in the Balkan wars and that it was incapable of war, unless it received help and reorganized its army. In February 1914, prominent deputies in the Montenegrin National Assembly pointed out the danger of the impending 'because the atmosphere smelled like gunpowder'. During this period, numerous Serbs from Boka and Bosnia and Herzegovina fled to Montenegro because they refused to fall into the hands of the Austro-Hungarian authorities and be tortured. Montenegro approached the Entente in the First World War, fought alongside Serbia against the Austro-Hungarian army and mobilized about 54,000 people. It declared war on Austria-Hungary on 6 August 1914.

Keywords: Montenegro, Austro-Hungary, Serbia, unification, political parties, border disputes, First World War.

LEKOVIĆ Žarko, dr., višji znanst. sod., Univerzitet Crne Gore, Istorijski institut, MN-81000 Podgorica, Bulevar revolucije br. 5, zarkol@ucg.ac.me

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5510-8877>

Pregled političnih, diplomatskih in družbenih razmer v Črni gori na predvečer prve svetovne vojne

Zgodovinski časopis, Ljubljana 78/2024 (169), št. 1–2, str. 148-166, cit 56.

1.01 izvorni znanstveni članek: jezik En. (Sn., En., Sn.)

Vojaški krogi avstro-ogrške monarhije so vedeli, da je Črna Gora izčrpana v balkanskih vojnah in da ni vojno sposobna, če ne dobi pomoči in reorganizirane vojske. Februarja 1914 so vidni poslanci v črnogorski državni skupščini opozorili na nevarnost vojne, ki prihaja, "ker je ozračje okoli njih dišalo po smodniku". V tem obdobju so številni Srbi iz Boke ter Bosne in Hercegovine pribežali v Črno Goro, ker niso želeli pasti v roke avstro-ogrski oblasti in biti mučeni. Črna Gora se je v prvi svetovni vojni približala antanti, se skupaj s Srbijo borila proti avstro-ogrski vojski in mobilizirala okoli 54.000 ljudi. Ta je 6. avgusta 1914 napovedala vojno Avstro-Ogrski.

Ključne besede: Črna Gora, Avstro-Ogrska, Srbija, združitev, politične stranke, mejni spori, prva svetovna vojna.

The eight Montenegrin governments between 1903 and 1914, most of which were led by Dr. Lazar Tomanović (from April 1907 to June 1912), were resolutely anti-Austro-Hungarian despite some pro-Austrian ministers, who were not originally from Montenegro. Austria-Hungary exerted economic and political pressure on Montenegro. Until 1911, it refused to sign a trade agreement with Montenegro. Trying to free itself from the economic domination of Austria-Hungary, Montenegro concluded trade agreements with other countries. For that purpose, at the beginning of the 20th century, it gave concessions to Italian capital because Italian capital was much less dangerous for the political independence of Montenegro than Austro-Hungarian capital.

The mass emigration of Montenegrins, i.e. their departure for work abroad, mostly to America, was also encouraged by Austria-Hungary through its authorities in Boka and Herzegovina and its agents in Montenegro. So due to the mass departure for work abroad the Montenegrin Ministry of War banned the departure of conscripts by way of an order from 1905. Consequently, Montenegrins crossed into Herzegovina or the Boka Kotorska, where the Austro-Hungarian authorities would give them travel documents to go to America. Austria-Hungary worked on it deliberately; in addition to charging for expensive services, it also tried to weaken the Montenegrin army because it was already preparing for the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and was aware that war with Montenegro was inevitable as soon as the final settlement of the Serbian question was on the agenda.¹ According to the data contained in the documents of the State Archives in Cetinje, at the time of the annexation crisis in 1908, there were up to 20,000 conscripts abroad. In 1912, a third of the Montenegrin military force was abroad, having emigrated to seek greener pastures. No small country in Europe has had such a large economic emigration in proportion to its population.

Austria-Hungary worked to deepen the gap between Serbia and Montenegro, in order to paralyze Serbian propaganda in Bosnia and Herzegovina and other South Slavic areas. The tense relations between Serbia and Montenegro during the Bombaš Affair and the Kolašin Affair² led to more open propaganda conflicts in foreign

¹ Rakočević, *Montenegro and Austria-Hungary*, pp. 185, 186.

² The Kolašin Affair was a rebellion in the Montenegrin military against the dictatorship of the Prince of Montenegro, Nikola I Petrović-Njegoš, that broke out in 1909. It followed the failed Bombaš Affair, a conspiracy organized in 1907 by a group of Montenegrin students to break the Montenegrin government through terrorist attacks, and ultimately unite Montenegro with Serbia, that which was detected/discovered and led to numerous arrests in 1908.

regions. All this was skilfully used by the Austro-Hungarian propaganda, which, especially in the Pljevlja area, attempted to differentiate the people according to their affiliation to Serbia or Montenegro. Agents blamed Cetinje for the conflict between Serbia and Montenegro, claiming that Montenegro could not help the Serbian people in the Pljevlja area and that the people in Montenegro were not Serbs, but Montenegrins.³

On the eve of the First World War, Austria-Hungary simply anathematized the Serbian people. Its border authorities viewed the Serbian Orthodox population as “second-class” citizens. Organized groups of *šuckori* intended to use economic coercion and violence to force Serbs in the border areas with Montenegro to renounce their national identity. This can be equated with terror that was felt by the largest number of Serbs in these regions. Systematic pressure was exerted on Orthodox children⁴ in schools and especially on teachers. Schools were closed in some places. Serbs were prevented from celebrating their Patron Saint Day because this was considered to be a political manifestation. It was forbidden to show the Serbian flag and coat of arms in houses, the roofs were torn down if they resembled the Serbian coat of arms, priests and intellectuals were taken hostage. This caused such legal and property-related insecurity that these people in the border areas lived in panic and huge fear.⁵

Victories in the Balkan wars brought significant expansion to Montenegro. It included the area around Podgorica, Metohija to Bijeli Drim with the towns of Peć and Đakovica, the western part of the Novi Pazar Sandzak with Pljevlja and Bijelo Polje, the towns of Mojkovac, Berane, Rožaje, Plav and Gusinje, so that the entire area of Vasojević, over 2,000 km², finally became part of Montenegro. Montenegro increased its territory by 4,958 km² and its area before the First World War comprised 14,433 km², and the population was about 350,000.⁶

The increase in territory, however, brought great worries to the government and burdened the state budget with new expenditures for the new organization of government. Montenegro did not have the financial resources or qualified personnel to organize the government in the liberated areas and modernize the state administration.

The difficult situation in Montenegro was described by the Minister of Finance Risto Popović: “The coffers are empty, there are millions of documents. Unrest, chaos, disorder, ruins. I regretted entering the cabinet but it is late now. Right at the beginning, as a greeting from the people, we received the news: Hunger”⁷

This situation had deteriorated since the Balkan wars. There was dissatisfaction among the people towards King Nikola. He was blamed for the severe crisis

³ Rakočević, *The situation on the Montenegrin-Turkish*, p. 498.

⁴ Mićanović, Šakotić, Vučković, *Establishment and development*, p. 318.

⁵ Lazić, *School conditions*, p. 161–175.

⁶ Stenographic notes on the work of the Montenegrin National Assembly - convened in the regular convocation on 15 January 1914, Cetinje, 1915.

⁷ Archives of the Historical Institute of Montenegro, fasc. 330. (Popović was a minister from 8 May 1913).

in which the state found itself, as well as for the difficulties in the realm of foreign policy because he led the country contrary to the wishes of its old patron, i.e. Russia. In such conditions the official government had to work on the political, economic and cultural-educational consolidation of the state.⁸

The successes achieved in the Balkan wars conditioned the calling of elections for the National Assembly, which were held on 29 December 1913 (according to the old calendar) and were marked by the dissatisfaction of the people and in which voters entrusted the opposition with their votes. The government's influence on the outcome of the elections was diminished due to the bankruptcy of the reactionary regime.⁹ We should keep in mind that the Balkan states expelled the Turks from Europe to everyone's surprise, so the idea of uniting the South Slavs seemed very realistic to the people.¹⁰

A sudden change was not possible because the local police authorities and military leaders, who had been conducting elections since 1907 and exercising power at their discretion, could not refrain from applying their methods in these elections. All signatories to the People's Party's programme, which was not officially renewed, including those sentenced in the bombing scandal who ran for parliament, were elected despite the government's efforts to influence voters not to vote for "club convicts".¹¹ They had over twenty deputies in the assembly. Several young educated deputies were gathered around the engineer Vasilije Žugić in a uniformed group that was supposed to represent the wing of the youth that held Marko Daković as its leader, who did not run for MP. In that group, the possible establishment of an agricultural party was hinted at. The power-holding Mijušković-Jabučka group gathered a large group of deputies. The right-wing party, which left power after six years, had only seven deputies. The Assembly began its work in the second half of January 1914, and the general mood was conciliatory. Gavriilo Cerović, a member of the People's Party, one of those who had been sentenced to prison in the bombing affair, was elected for a vice president. Supporters of the former People's Party, the Mijušković-Jabučka group and the group around Marko Daković agreed, which resulted in the formation of a parliamentary bloc of the majority and that of a coalition government under the presidency of Janko Vukotić. The support of the group of deputies around Vasilije Žugić by the Mijušković-Jabučka group was aimed at weakening the influence of the People's Party.¹²

The government consisted of: Janko Vukotić, Risto Popović (Minister of Finance and Construction), Savo Vuletić (Minister of the Interior), all of whom came from the Mijušković-Jabučka group, as well as three members of the People's Party: Gavriilo Cerović (Minister of Education), Ljubomir Bakić (Minister of Justice) and Petar Plamenac (Minister of Foreign Affairs) who only formally declared

⁸ Vojinović, *Montenegrin intelligentsia*, p. 250.

⁹ Archives of Yugoslavia, fond 80, fasc. 49, 228. (Collection of Jovan Jovanović Pižon).

¹⁰ Archives of Yugoslavia, fond 83, fasc. 5, 37, Sava Kosanović (Mihailo Tomić Report).

¹¹ Škerović, *Montenegro at the dawn*, p. 592.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 593, 594.

himself a club player.¹³ With this government, Montenegro welcomed the First World War, this was the government of Serdar Janko Vukotić, which reorganized on 25 April 1914.¹⁴

During the war, the National Assembly did not convene for 16 months. It convened for an extraordinary session on 25 December 1915, when the situation was already critical for Montenegro. The coalition government of Serdar Janko Vukotić relied on the working bloc of deputies, which consisted of club members, right-wingers and youth deputies. They had an overwhelming majority, about fifty deputies, who were led by Milo Cerović, a merchant from Nikšić, and voted in favour of all proposals submitted by the Government to the Assembly.

Citizens from the newly liberated areas did not take part in the elections to the National Assembly in January 1914. Thus, the newly elected National Assembly decided on all issues concerning the new regions without their representatives.¹⁵

Due to the internal and external problems faced by Montenegro the government began to talk about the union with Serbia as the only way out of the crisis. This was discussed during the Skadar crisis but the idea became relevant at the beginning of 1914. The initiative for a real union with Serbia came from the official factors of Montenegro, and to that end, the king sent his commissioner Lazar Mijušković to Belgrade. The unification movement in Montenegro was widely spread and present among the people, political circles and the army, far superior in the National Assembly and strongly maintained in the government. In wider circles, the unification movement formulated the thesis of one state on the basis of national consciousness, taking the temptation of Montenegro in the Balkan wars as proof of a safer future that should be sought exclusively in a common state. The Balkan wars showed that Serbia and Montenegro were a moral and political stronghold and a real gathering place for supporters of the unification and opponents of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. In the course of 1914, Montenegro significantly strengthened relations with Serbia, which contributed to its improved reputation among other South Slavic peoples in the unliberated areas. The people were not against the unification of Montenegro and Serbia with other Yugoslav peoples. On the contrary, the vast majority supported the unification. This desire had emotional and rational roots. Emotional roots stemmed from a sense of ethnic togetherness and a desire for the brothers to come together in a common state, and rational ones from an awareness of the political and economic necessity and benefits of unification.¹⁶

Following the popular mood and realizing that Montenegro could not further develop economically and culturally without relying on Serbia nor defend its independence, the government of General Janko Vukotić worked publicly and secretly to strengthen ties with Serbia. Its programme, which was presented to

¹³ Rakočević, *Elections for the Montenegrin*, p. 421.

¹⁴ Archives of the State Museum of Cetinje, Nikola I, 1914, fasc. I, 3. (With this reorganization Labud Gojnić, Minister of the Interior, and Mirko Mijušković, Minister of Education and Church Affairs, left the government.)

¹⁵ Dašić, Overview of territorial expansion, p. 131.

¹⁶ Vujović, *Montenegrin federalists 1919—1929*.

the National Assembly in February 1914, clearly hints at the aspiration towards a military, customs and diplomatic union with Serbia. In raising the issue of relations with Serbia, primarily in Montenegro, the starting point was the indisputable fact that Montenegro and Serbia were two Serbian states.

On 2 March 1914 (according to the old calendar), King Nikola sent a letter to King Peter, proposing that on the basis of equality of the two states and their dynasties, mutual obligations in military, diplomatic and financial matters be strengthened. He actually suggested creating a real union between Montenegro and Serbia, which was supposed to be the first stage of the integral national unification. Inter alia, the letter reads: "Our people in this last war were, as always, brave and enduring and aware of the task they performed gloriously. Glory to our good Serbs, who rose with enthusiasm and courage and set out on the paths that Your Majesty and I had marked out. And to repay these virtuous people, I think, my dear brother, that we can do it best if we lay a solid foundation for a consensual work." Additionally, King Nikola wrote the following: "As soon as possible, our agreement in this direction would be beneficial to both sides. There is an urgent need to agree on the basis of independence and equality of our states and dynasties in marking duties according to a common task in the military, diplomatic and financial fields. If we do all this during our lifetimes, my dear brother, how easier it will be for our souls and tired lives to work for the good and happiness of our people!" He concludes: "If Your Majesty is of the same opinion, it would be necessary for one or two statesmen, Yours and Mine, to meet as soon as possible, to draw up a plan for the unity of our states based on the above. Always with an idea of general good for Serbs, in this step in time, which I consider appropriate, I am convinced that I will encounter a wholehearted response in the patriotic soul of Your Majesty and your wise statesmen."¹⁷

The cautious and distrustful Pašić did not want to enter into negotiations with Montenegro without Russia's knowledge. Together with Mijušković, he visited Hartwig and introduced him to the contents of King Nikola's letter. In the presence of the Russian envoy, Pašić accepted the obligation from the Serbian side to preserve the dynasties and the independence of the states. The Serbian government wrote the text of the letter to King Nikola, and King Petar signed it and the letter was sent on 20 March (according to the old calendar). King Nikola's proposal to create strong ties between Serbia and Montenegro and the proposal to appoint delegates to draft the agreement were accepted. Due to the delicacy of the work, it was proposed to have only one delegate each, Prime Minister Pašić from Serbia, and the Montenegrin ambassador to Belgrade Lazar Mijušković.¹⁸

The delegates, as far as is known, quickly agreed on the draft agreement. The Russian Ambassador to Belgrade Hartwig, who was certainly well informed about this problem, brought some details of this project on 12 May: 1) the preservation of dynasties and independence of the united army 2) leaving the supreme command of the united army to each ruler of troops in his country 3) the establishment of a

¹⁷ Archives of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, World War, doc. nor. 9771.

¹⁸ Rakočević, *Relations between Montenegro*, p. 99.

general 4) the coordination of foreign policy and establishment of joint representations abroad for both countries 5) the equalization of judicial and administrative institutions 6) the financial, customs and postal-telephone union.

King Nikola, however, did not sign this agreement. On 11 June 1914, he went abroad, where he was found by the Sarajevo assassin.¹⁹

The attitude of Austria-Hungary endangered the independence of Serbia but also caused the awakening of Serbian nationalism. The personality of King Petar Karađorđević and his past seemed to be created to be at the forefront of this nationalism. He put up strong resistance to Austria-Hungary in the customs war and, subsequently, also in the annexation crisis. Along with him, the main burden of the fight with Austria-Hungary was borne by Nikola Pašić, who was energetic and persistent in his work, cold and thoughtful. Just as before Pašić, Prince Mihailo and Jovan Ristić were the bearers of Serbian nationalism in the fight against the Turks, so Pašić was destined to be the bearer of Serbian nationalism in the fight against Austria-Hungary with King Petar.²⁰ The people in the Yugoslav regions under Austria-Hungary wanted liberation, the bulk of them wanted unification with Serbia. However, those people were not yet ready, spiritually or materially speaking, to lead a large-scale action against their oppressors. The organization of the Austro-Hungarian administration was formally perfect, so that the fighting movements of the masses were almost excluded. Individual actions could only lead to harassment of the authorities, but not to the realization of a great national task.²¹ The Austro-Hungarian diplomacy and the army considered the unification of Montenegro and Serbia as an immediate danger to the survival of the Habsburg monarchy; consequently, they set themselves the task of preventing this unification by any means necessary, including war. As early as at the beginning of 1914, Austria-Hungary made diplomatic and military preparations to prevent the unification of Montenegro and Serbia and openly raised the question of the possession of Lovćen. Austria-Hungary sought to win over Italy to its point of view. At the beginning of April, a meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary and Italy was held in Opatija. Italy did not accept the thesis that unification could be prevented by war, arguing that there was no danger of immediate unification and that other Balkan states were also interested in that issue. On the other hand, in order to prevent the German penetration to the east, tsarist Russia fully adopted the view of the unification of Montenegro and Serbia, wanting it to be realized gradually, so as not to provoke premature military intervention by Austria-Hungary. "Russia will pursue Serbian policy towards Montenegro, and we are waiting for Mr. Pašić to make his proposal to us", said Anatoly Anatolyevich Neratov, Russia's assistant foreign minister in late April 1914.²²

The hostility of Austro-Hungary towards Montenegro was announced before the beginning of the Great War. On 21 February 1914, the Austro-Hungarian army

¹⁹ Rakočević, *The time of Prince and King Nikola*, p. 94.

²⁰ Pržić, *Serbia's foreign policy*, pp. 162, 163.

²¹ Stojanović, *Serbia and Yugoslav*, p. 10.

²² Škerović, *Montenegro during the*, p. 6.

in the strength of one battalion attacked the Montenegrin watchtower on the hill Sjenokos above Metaljka and killed 1 soldier and 1 local and set the watchtower on fire. After this event, the Austro-Hungarian commander did not find it necessary to come for an investigation. Despite that, the text of the alleged apology of the Montenegrin side for the events in Metaljka was published in a Vienna newspaper. The Habsburg monarchy did not pay attention to Montenegro's denial. Before the declaration of war, an Austro-Hungarian sniper unit (irregular police) invaded Montenegrin territory from Bosnia and opened fire on the Montenegrin office. The action of the Serbian government and army prevented further hostility.²³

The case of Sjenokos clearly indicated that Austro-Hungarian imperialist circles, and especially the military, did not intend to accept the current situation in the Balkans. Austria-Hungary did not pay attention to the protests of Montenegro and did not want to withdraw the army from the occupied position until the outbreak of the First World War. Vienna did not accept the Montenegrin proposal to form a joint commission that would consider the whole case. In the war of 1912, Sjenokos was taken from Turkey by Serbian troops, and for Austria-Hungary, i.e. for its military command in Sarajevo, it was needed for purely strategic reasons. Montenegro could do nothing but accept the loss of that position.²⁴

The relations between Montenegro and Austria-Hungary in 1914 were characterized by crises, but also by easing of tensions, and each crisis seemed more severe and more dangerous than the previous one. Occasionally, chances for peace and the establishment of friendly relations were indicated, but they were missed. Austria-Hungary, whose policy in the Balkans was considered the cause of the war in 1914, often behaved rudely and arrogantly towards the temperamental Montenegrin ruler and his minions. Montenegro, whose almost absurd poverty was the inspiration for Franz Lehár for the operetta *The Merry Widow*, did its best to fill its empty coffers and expand its borders, provoking and angering its much larger neighbour. It happened that in 1914, Austria and Serbia started destroying dominoes, but even before the July crisis, there were several occasions when many believed that the conflict between the Dual Monarchy and Montenegro could set Europe on fire.²⁵

Poverty was gaining momentum in Montenegro, its people were suffering from hunger and more and more people were going to customs offices to receive help in grain that came from Russia. The poverty-stricken people waited for six days to receive help in the form of grain, and in the end they had to return home empty-handed.²⁶ The difficult financial situation caused the Assembly to pass the Law on the Exemption of Conscripts from Paying Compulsory Labor for 1913 in mid-May 1914. Under this law, all conscripts "who performed military duties during the war, except for clerks and merchants or craftsmen who maintained their

²³ Petrović, *Austro-Hungarian occupation*, p. 213.

²⁴ Rakočević, *Relations between Austria-Hungary*, p. 69. (There were only four Montenegrin soldiers on Sjenokos, one of whom was killed and three wounded.)

²⁵ Treadway, *Falcon and Eagle*, pp. 10, 190–193.

²⁶ State Archives of Montenegro, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Administrative Department, fasc. 145, 1336 and fasc. 147, 2180.

activities during that time,” are exempt from payment. The law, as can be seen, was intended to, above all, make it easier for the peasant, who suffered the most in the war. The “Central Council for the Settlement of the Newly Liberated Areas” was established in Cetinje and which was tasked with distributing 100,000 acres of land in Metohija and 50,000 in other newly liberated areas. It was calculated that 5,000 households could settle in that area, while there were as many as 10,019 applications. Municipal boards in those areas were also elected, as well as local councils in Peć and Đakovica²⁷ Only a month after the law was passed, there were already 250 families in Peć “some of whom had no shelter”. Shortly afterwards, it was reported that there were 300 families in Peć “with many small children, who can be found on the street”. On the other hand, if the Austrian data can be trusted, from May to July 1914, 8,570 Muslims emigrated from the newly liberated parts of Montenegro via Bar to Turkey, and by mid-July of the same year, 16,507.²⁸

Several thousand Montenegrins were working in America, so the Montenegrin government tried to bring back as many of them as possible to their homeland. In September 1914, the government hired Mihail Pupin, a world-renowned scientist and professor at the University of New York, on this issue, who would do great benefits to Montenegro. On 17 March 1914, MP Gavriilo M. Cerović asked the Minister of the Interior Labud Gojnić, addressing the problem of the emigration of the Montenegrin labourers and military forces to the United States, whether he intended to take action to prevent this as soon as possible. In his question, Cerović maintained the following: “Particularly lately, at a time when we are passing laws on the settlement of newly acquired areas, we have witnesses such mass emigration of our labour and military forces to America, all without a permit or a passport, that if we do not stop it, we will not have enough labour force that would cultivate land in the old borders of Montenegro, not to mention further consequences such as the country’s defence, etc. The main fact in this whole matter is that our emigrants go to the aid of the Austrian authorities in Kotor, Dubrovnik and other border places, giving them through their agents some documents, according to which foreign authorities would have to treat them as Austro-Hungarian citizens and favouring them with certain shipping companies, so they could move to America for a small price “. ²⁹ This was just a continuation of a dangerous plan directed against Montenegro and its economic and military strength. At the end of August 1914, 2,000 fighters from America were ready to return.³⁰ Exactly one year later, about 3,000 volunteers were sent to Montenegro, in smaller and larger groups, from the end of January to the end of August, among whom were, for instance, 600 people from Bjut.³¹

The war broke out in the only area where the wars did not stop, in the former territory of the Ottoman Empire. It began with an attack by the Austrian govern-

²⁷ Glas Crnogorca, No. 15, 15 March 1914.

²⁸ Radusinović, *Population of Montenegro*, pp. 183, 184.

²⁹ State Archives of Montenegro, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Administrative Department, 1914, fasc. 144, 1007.

³⁰ State Archives of Montenegro, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1914, IV, 2414.

³¹ Archives of the State Museum of Cetinje, Nikola I, 1915, 158.

ment on Serbia. Austria declared its intention to localize the war, but the Russian government did not want to leave Serbia, making this an European conflict despite the efforts of the British Minister of Foreign Affairs. Nowadays, it was determined that no government wanted to provoke a general war; however, the Russian tsar allowed an order for general mobilization to be issued and in Germany the general staff urged the government to launch an attack that the military science at the time considered a prerequisite for success.³²

When the Austrian heir to the throne Franz Ferdinand was murdered by Gavrilo Princip in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914, on the feast of St. Vitus or *Vidovdan*, which is regarded as a sacred day in the Orthodox calendar (on this day in 1389 the medieval Serbian empire led by Prince Lazar fought against the invading Turks and lost the Battle of Kosovo and experienced the disintegration of the state), the Viennese government took the event as a welcome occasion to blame official Serbia for the murder. Having been ready – as we have seen – to deal with Serbia a long time ago, it issued – without any concrete evidence of guilt, even against the statement of her chief investigator on the matter – an ultimatum that had been drafted in advance so as to be unacceptable, and then on July 28 declared war. For this, Austria-Hungary used the motive from the explanation by which it had declared war on Italy in 1859.³³

On 23 July 1914, Austria-Hungary handed Serbia a note in the form of an ultimatum, stating that it would sever relations with Serbia if Serbia did not fulfil, without discussion, literally everything it was asked for in the ultimatum within 48 hours. The agreements in the ultimatum were very difficult. Austria-Hungary even demanded that Serbia fire the officers and officials it requested from the civil service. To accept those conditions meant for Serbia to give up its independence and autonomy. Nevertheless, in order to avoid the conflict and absolve itself from all responsibility the Serbian government accepted almost everything that was asked in the ultimatum through Nikola Pašić's extraordinarily wisely composed response, with the exception of Serbia becoming an ordinary Austrian province – a permit for the Austro-Hungarian court and police to operate in Serbia.³⁴

In the July crisis of 1914, Montenegro found itself in an extremely difficult position, even though it was not exposed to accusations of the murder of the Austro-Hungarian heir to the throne in Sarajevo. It was in a deep economic crisis in those days, and its army, with its outdated organization and weak weapons and equipment, was not capable of waging a modern war. However, despite these enormous difficulties, Montenegro has resolutely sided with Serbia. The people understood the threats to Serbia and, subsequently, the Austro-Hungarian attack on Serbia as an attack on Montenegro and the Serbs in general.

The news of the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian heir to the throne caught King Nikola on his way between Salzburg and Trieste, returning to Montenegro. The king arrived in Cetinje on the morning of 30 June. Immediately upon

³² Senjobas, *Comparative history*, p. 409.

³³ Ćorović, *The struggle for independence*, p. 176.

³⁴ Stanojević, *History of the Serbian people*, p. 415.

his arrival, he sent his condolences to the Austro-Hungarian emperor and ordered a 15-day court mourning.³⁵

The Montenegrin government refrained from commenting. The periodical *Glas Crnogorca* featured only a brief report about the murder, sharply condemning the assassins and their act.³⁶

However, the persecution of Serbs in Austria-Hungary, the frantic attacks on Serbia and the incitement to war against Serbia in the Austro-Hungarian press caused a popular revolt in Montenegro. On 4, 5 and 6 July, anti-Austro-Hungarian demonstrations took place in Cetinje, in which up to 400 citizens took part. The Montenegrin government banned further demonstrations.

The participant in the assassination Muhamed Mehmedbašić managed to escape to Montenegro. On 12 July Montenegrin authorities arrested the 27-year-old Mehmedbašić, a carpenter from Stolac in Bosnia, who was wanted by the Sarajevo District Court for having participated in the assassination. The Austro-Hungarian intelligence service soon discovered that Mehmedbašić was in Nikšić and, consequently, the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs asked the Montenegrin government for his extradition. The Montenegrin government allowed Mehmedbašić to move from Nikšić to the interior of Montenegro and the Austro-Hungarian minister was told that he had “managed to escape” from the Nikšić prison due to the inattention of state authorities.³⁷

Although the Austro-Hungarian diplomatic activity aimed at gaining Montenegro for neutrality began in mid-July, in the scope of which it was promised financial assistance and territorial expansion, on 24 July, the day after the ultimatum, the government helmed by King Nikola sent a message to the Serbian government, maintaining that it was difficult to decide what answer to give, but that it would be good to listen to Russia’s advice. His message reads as follows: “In any case, tell Mr. Pašić that side with Serbia in good or bad times. Its destiny is ours as well.” When Mihailo Gavrilović, the Serbian ambassador to Cetinje, raised the question of whether Serbia can count on fraternal and unlimited assistance in the conflict with Austria-Hungary, he received the following answer: “Serbia can count on the fraternal and unlimited help of Montenegro, both in this fateful hour for the Serbian people and in every other.”³⁸

In the exclusive edition of *Glas Crnogorca*, before the news arrived that Austria-Hungary had declared war on Serbia, a decree on the mobilization of the Montenegrin army was published. The Montenegrin National Assembly met in an urgent session on 1 August 1914. The event was attended by all MPs. The galleries were full of people. It unanimously decided to immediately declare war on Austria-Hungary. On 5 August, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Petar Plamenac

³⁵ Rakočević, *Relations between Austria-Hungary*, p. 69.

³⁶ Mitrović, *Serbia*, pp. 15, 16. (A Montenegrin minister at the time gave the correct impression: “The joy and anxiety of this event occurred with the responsible factors, and only joy among the people.”)

³⁷ Ivović, *The assassin Muhamed Mehmedbašić*, pp. 35-49.

³⁸ Rakočević, *Political relations*, p. 229.

handed a note to the Austro-Hungarian ambassador to Cetinje, informing him that his mission in Cetinje was over. The next day, on 6 August 6, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador left Cetinje. On the same day, King Nikola issued a proclamation informing the Montenegrins that he was forced to “call them to the Holy war for the freedom of Serbs and South Slavs in less than two years and for the third time”.³⁹

The Montenegrin army of about 45,000 combatants was divided as follows: for defense against Austria-Hungary – the Coastal Detachment under the command of Division-General Mitar Martinović, the Herzegovinian Detachment under the command of divisional officer Janko Vukotić – as the largest group of Montenegrin army was along Herzegovina from Grahovo to Lever Tara and Sandžak detachment under the command of Brigadier Luka Gojnić, for the defense of Pljevlja. Montenegro’s war capabilities were modest. An Old Serbian detachment was formed under the command of Brigadier Radomir Vešović to protect the border with Albania. There was no plan for war, nor an elaborate plan for mobilization and concentration of the Montenegrin army. The supreme commander was King Nikola, and the chief of staff was divisional officer *serdar* Janko Vukotić, who went to Grahovo on 2 August to be the commander of the Herzegovinian detachment. At the same time, he was the prime minister and the minister of war. The Supreme Command remained in Cetinje. Apart from the king’s adjutants, there were no officers in the Supreme Command.⁴⁰

Until the arrival of the Serbian military mission, the Montenegrin army fought quite hard on the field of the Herzegovinian detachment, particularly on Grahovo. On 1 August 1914, the enemy comprising 2 battalions with 12 rapid-fire mountain cannons and 14 machine guns attacked Montenegrin positions from Gacko to Lipnik through Samobor, with the right wing and the left along Izgor in the direction of Kručica, so that Montenegrin troops retreated to Ravno. The fighting continued on 4, 5 and 6 August, when the enemy withdrew from Glasovita.⁴¹

At the very beginning of the operation, the Sandzak detachment with 10 battalions, one and a half batteries with 6 cannons and four machine guns conquered Metaljka, and then the town of Čajniče. They continued operations in the direction of Goražde, but in the village Gramusovići, they were attacked by the Austrian division on 2 August and the overwhelming enemy army pushed them from their position in the direction of Pljevlja. Following a short mitigation, a strong counter-attack by the Austro-Hungarian army began on 14–16 August, 1914. After the weak resistance of the Sandžak detachment, the Austro-Hungarian army first entered Pljevlja and occupied the city on the Transfiguration, i.e. on August 19, then captured Prijepolje and continued towards Sjenica to pursue the Serbian army. With the fall of Pljevlja, a great crisis started in this part of the battlefield. Montenegro was saved by the victory of the Serbian army on Cer and in Jadar, after which the

³⁹ Rakočević, *Military-political situation*, p. 19.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 15, 16.

⁴¹ Archives of the Historical Institute of Montenegro, Vule Knežević, Durmitor Brigade. (Herzegovinian detachment was on the front, 130 km long, extending from 130-km-long from Ščepan-Polje to Grahovo)

Austro-Hungarian army withdrew from the Raška region to Bosnia. At the end of August, the Sandžak detachment entered the abandoned Pljevlja.⁴² On the other hand, in mid-August, the Montenegrin army occupied Budva.⁴³

The grouping of the Montenegrin army and its initial operations were not coordinated with the operational plan of the Serbian army, which had an adverse effect on the battlefield. At the request of Serbian Prime Minister Pašić, on 6 August 1914, the Chief of Staff of the Serbian Supreme Command, Duke Radomir Putnik, drew up a “Joint Action Plan for the Serbian and Montenegrin Armies in the War against Austria-Hungary.” Duke Putnik predicted that two thirds of the Montenegrin army would be grouped in the region of Pljevlja, for operations in the direction Čajniče–Goražde–Sarajevo in order to cooperate with the Serbian Užice army, which will operate from Mokra Gora via Višegrad to Sarajevo.

This plan was brought by the Serbian military mission, which came to Montenegro on 21 August 1914. The mission consisted of General Božo Janković, his assistant Colonel Petar Pešić, Engineering Colonel Borivoje Nešić and Lieutenant Colonels Ljuba Mihailović and Đorđe Paligorić. On 24 August 1914, King Nikola formed the headquarters of the Montenegrin Supreme Command from Serbian officers and two Montenegrin captains. He appointed General Božo Janković as Chief of Staff. At the beginning of the war, Serbia sent 30 cannons with ammunition and 17 million dinars to Montenegro. By the way, the Russian tsar suggested to King Nikola that the Montenegrin army should work in agreement with the Serbian one and that the operations be managed by a single headquarters, namely, the Serbian supreme command.⁴⁴

However, it was not possible to reach a complete agreement between King Nikola and the Supreme Command and, at times, major or minor misunderstandings occurred. When the Montenegrin government withdrew its envoy to the Supreme Command in mid-October 1914, the Foreign Office sought to settle the dispute as soon as possible. Arthur Nicholson, the permanent undersecretary, referred to it a “stupid conflict” and suggested supporting the French request, and for the two forces to work together to ensure that Montenegro cooperates with Serbia and does not question the collaboration between them.⁴⁵

King Nikola considered entering Skadar with the army in August 1914, but decided against it due to the advice of the Russian and Italian diplomacy that were against the withdrawal of forces from the front towards Austria-Hungary. He then promised to obey Russia’s advice through Foreign Minister Petar Plamenac; however, at the same time made it known that he would not give up Skadar, emphasizing that he would make such a request when Russia finally defeated Austria-Hungary.⁴⁶

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Archives of the Historical Institute of Montenegro, fasc. 346, Work of the Montenegrin army from 11 July to 6 August 1914 up to the arrival of Serbian officers.

⁴⁴ Živojinović, *Allies*, pp. 121–146.

⁴⁵ Živojinović, *Great Britain*, p. 204.

⁴⁶ Ratković, *Conflict between Italy*, p. 99.

General Oskar Potiorek, the Commander of the Austro-Hungarian Balkan army, underestimating the Serbian and Montenegrin defence capabilities intended to win a decisive victory with the help of the “B” echelon stationed in Vojvodina by August 18, the birthday of Emperor Franz Joseph. Due to the haste, insufficient preparation and early forcing of Drina, on 12 August, Potiorek’s Fifth Army fell into a deadlock in the first days of the battle. As soon as it crossed the Drina, it encountered fierce resistance from the bulk of the regrouped Serbian army. The Serbian Supreme Command learned of the main direction of the attack in time and immediately accepted the decisive battle on Mount Cer from 16-18th August. The skilfully led Serbian army managed to break up the Austro-Hungarian Fifth Army and the newly arrived eighth corps and return them to their initial positions across the Drina, with catastrophic losses. This broke the first Austro-Hungarian offensive on Serbia and Montenegro.

Immediately at the beginning of the war, the Austro-Hungarian fleet from the Bay of Kotor blocked the Montenegrin coast and from time to time bombed Montenegrin positions, with its three cruisers “Kaiser Karl IV”, “Szigetvar” and “Zenta”. In order for the Entente to remain free by water transport to Montenegro, the French fleet sailed into the Port of Bar on 16 August, where it received some British units as reinforcements, preventing “Zenta” from entering the port and managing to sink it.⁴⁷ In order not to use larger military forces towards Montenegro due to poor communications, Austria-Hungary built fortifications not only towards the Bay of Kotor but also towards Herzegovina. It was not possible to break through the lines of the fortifications without significant losses because the fortifications had modern technical equipment, cannons and machine guns. Consequently, the Montenegrin and French batteries – from their positions on Lovćen – would open strong fire on the Austrian fortifications above Kotor. The Austrians also responded from their warships in the bay. In one such artillery battle, which took place on 6 October, the “Vrmac” fortification was completely damaged.⁴⁸

It should be noted that from the very beginning of war operations on the fronts of the Montenegrin army, the Austro-Hungarian air force machine-gunned towns, villages and military positions, not adhering to the Rulebook on Laws and Customs of War⁴⁹ on Land, which prohibits (Article 25) “attacking or bombing by any means undefended towns, villages, settlements or buildings”.⁵⁰

During September and October, the Sandžak army, which had been formed on 28 August, and the Drina detachment were on a strong offensive against Sarajevo. In order to carry out more successful operations in south-eastern Bosnia, the Drina detachment had been formed in Goransko on 30 August.

On September 2, units of the Sandžak army broke the enemy’s resistance and liberated Čajniče and, subsequently, expelled the enemy across the Drina, where they broke out on 7 September. Foča was liberated on 8 September, whereupon

⁴⁷ Bjađini, *Relations between Italy*, p. 40.

⁴⁸ Glas Crnogorca, No. 56, 8 October 1914.

⁴⁹ See Svoljšak, *Between two Fires*, pp.1004,1005

⁵⁰ Kovačević, *About the Austro-Hungarian Bombing*, p. 182.

units of the Sandžak army met with the Drina detachment on Jabuka near Goražde. These units crossed the Drina from 11 to 14 September downstream from Foča and Goražde. On 16 September, the Supreme Command made a decision to send the Sandzak army to the Višegrad–Rogatica front and to merge with the Uziče army. Almost half of the total number of the Montenegrin soldiers engaged in these operations. The Montenegrin army liberated Rogatica on 17 September and set up a civilian government there. Subsequently, the Montenegrin units took control of Glasinac and the Prača Valley, and in Romanija they took control of the outposts of Markovo Brdo and Siljeva Glava. Reconnaissance units pushed through Romanija and Jahorina towards Sarajevo, liberated Pale on 25 September, and practically occupied Romanija, interrupting the Sarajevo–Vlasenica communication. However, when the Austrians undertook an offensive from the north across the Sava in early October and Poćorek on the lower Drina, the Užice army had to withdraw from Romanija to Višegrad. Consequently, the Montenegrin army had to withdraw to Glasinac on 7 October, where it took up defensive positions. This army fought fierce battles on Glasinac from 10 to 21 October and when its left wing was broken on 21 October, it even retreated to the right side of the Drina. In the battles on Glasinac, the Sandžak army suffered heavy losses. 1,270 soldiers, non-commissioned officers and officers were killed and wounded. With the retreat of the Sandžak army to the right bank of the Drina, the Užice army had to withdraw across the Drina, blaming the Sandžak army and its commander Janko Vukotić for the failure.⁵¹

After rejecting Serb and Montenegrin units from Bosnia, the Austro-Hungarian troops launched an offensive on Serbia and repulsed Serb military forces at the Kolubara and the West Morava Watershed, where the largest battle between two armies on the 200-km-long front would take place from 16 November to 15 December.

When the Uziče army began withdrawing from the Višegrad region in order to have a position near Užice on November 15, the newly formed Lim division from the Sandžak army was sent in the direction of Višegrad–Prijboj. From 23 to 27 November, it fought daily battles at positions around Višegrad. Finally, on 11 December (according to the new calendar), the units of the Lim division captured Višegrad after a two-day battle. They captured a number of Austrian soldiers and gained rich spoils of war. The enemy destroyed the bridge over the Drina and set fire to two magazines in the towns. The Lim division then occupied the right bank of the Drina from Stari Brod to the mouth of the Lim, where it was placed under the command of the Užice army on 19 December. During that period there were no fights on the front of the Sandžak army and the Drina detachment. Consequently, the Drina detachment was sent to Nikšić and the Sandžak army occupied its positions.⁵²

After the victory of the Serbian army in the Battle of Kolubara, the liberation of Belgrade and the expulsion of the enemy from Serbia, a truce prevailed on the fronts and lasted until October 1915.

⁵¹ Zelenika, *Battle on the Drina*, p. 43.

⁵² Glas Crnogorca, Cetinje, No. 67, 6 December 1914.

On the occasion of the liberation of Belgrade, King Nikola sent a congratulatory telegram to the Supreme Commander of the Serbian Army. His Majesty to his successor Aleksandar: "My army, all Montenegro and I, are delighted with the new great victory of the Serbian forces near Biograd, the expulsion of our common enemy from it and the victorious entry of your army into the capital of Serbia. The day when Biograd was returned to the Serbian bosom with a catastrophic defeat for our enemy is one of the happiest days of my life. Praise God, who bestows this great happiness on us! Glory to the Serbian knights! I am very happy to congratulate you and your army on this success, which raises the Serbian name to triumph."⁵³

In the end, it should be pointed out that the Austro-Hungarian army left numerous traces of its atrocities during the fall into Sandzak and the retreat across the Drina. Pieces of human bodies were found in streams and ravines: children, women and the elderly. On the way from Prijepolje to Goražde many Serbian houses grieved the loss of their loved ones, many of them were completely destroyed, with their family members and their properties in flames. Seventeen innocent Serbs were killed in Prijepolje, including two citizens from Pljevlja. Some of these were buried alive, which was determined during the exhumation of the corpses. In Boljanić, they massacred and destroyed the entire Borović family. They dishonoured numerous Serbian women and girls. The Drobnjak family was slaughtered in the village Poblac. Glišo and Božo Dačević were killed in the village of Kovač. They also committed crimes under Metaljka, in the village Mostina, then in Čajniče, Foča and Goražde, where they killed respectable Serbs.⁵⁴

Due to this situation on the battlefield in Montenegro, misinformation was spread. Thus, the commander of the Sandžak army, Division Officer Vukotić informed the public from Goražde on 5 September 1918: "I was informed that news were spread that my regional army had perished and was in despair, especially the brigades in Spuž and Lovćen. On the contrary, the army is, thank God, very cheerful and satisfied with relatively few losses, it achieved great success. It is not tired of the daily fierce fighting or of the crossings of the cliffs and the rivers."⁵⁵ It should be said that the Ministry of the Interior quickly and accurately informed the people through the regional administrations about everything important that was happening on its and its allies' battlefields. However, despite previous orders that the administrative authorities prevent the spread of misinformation, subjecting to legal regulations both those who forge or modify the news and those who spread it, the country was still spreading untrue voices, especially about the events on the battlefields. More than once, for instance news were spread that entire battalions of the Montenegrin army and even brigades had been destroyed, even when not a single Montenegrin soldier was killed. It is clear what excitement they brought to the people and what damage misinformation made. Consequently, on 3 October 3 1914, the Minister of the Interior, Savo P. Vuletić, issued a notice to all administrative authorities in the country, and particularly to regional administrations, whereby they

⁵³ Glas Crnogorca, Cetinje, No. 67, 6 December 1914.

⁵⁴ Glas Crnogorca, Cetinje, No. 59, 15 October 1914.

⁵⁵ Glas Crnogorca, Cetinje, No. 48, 10 September 1914.

were strictly ordered to prevent any further spread of false news. As soon as such news was spread, the administrative authority was to conduct an investigation, to determine who forged and spread the false news. As soon as that was established, Article 358 (item 3) of the Criminal Code was to be applied to the perpetrators. If the matter was not of a more serious nature and subject to court proceedings, the perpetrators were to be indicted by the competent court.⁵⁶

We can conclude that Princip's shot in 1914 was just an occasion that Austria-Hungary took for the First World War. That war, of course, did not start the struggle for the creation of a common state, but ended it. What had been prepared decades earlier, and even when it was doubted as historically possible, then began to materialize and turn into action. In addition to huge material sacrifices, Montenegro sacrificed half of its army and one-third of its population for the victory of the Allies.

Sources and literature

Sources

- Archives of Yugoslavia, fond 80, fasc. 49, 228. (Collection of Jovan Jovanović Pižon); fond 83, fasc. 5, 37, Sava Kosanović (Report by Mihailo Tomić).
 Archive of the State Museum of Cetinje, Nichola I, 1914, fasc. I, 3.
 Archives of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, World War, document number: 9771
 Archives of the State Museum of Cetinje, fund By years, Nichola I, 1915, 158.
 Archives of the Historical Institute of Montenegro,
 fasc. 115 Vule Knežević, Durmitor brigade;
 fasc. 346, Work of the Montenegrin Army from July 11 to August 6, 1914 - until the arrival of Serbian officers;
 fasc. 330, Montenegro in World War I.
 State Archives of Montenegro
 Border Commissariat Žabljak, 1914, fasc. 4.
 Ministry of Internal Affairs, Administrative Department, 1914, fasc. 144, 1007, fasc. 145, 1336, fasc. 147, 2180.
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1914, IV, 2414.
 Newspapers
 Glas Crnogorca, Cetinje, 15 March 1914, no. 15, 10 September 1914, no. 48, 3 October 1914, no. 54, 8 October 1914, no. 56, 15 October 1914, no. 59, 6 December 1914, no. 67.

Literature

- Bjadini, Antonelo F. M. Relations between Italy and Montenegro during the First World War (1914–1918), *Historical Records* 1–2, 1983, pp. 33–51.
 Ćorović, Vladimir, *Struggle for the independence of the Balkans*, Belgrade, 1937.
 Dašić, Miomir, Overview of the territorial expansion of the Montenegrin state, *Istorijski zapisi*, 1, 1987, pp. 115–131.
 Ivović, Jovan, Assassin Muhamed Mehmedbašić in Nikšić, *Istoriski zapisi*, 1–2, 1949, pp. 35–49.
 Kovačević, Branislav, *About the Austro-Hungarian Bombing of Montenegro in the First World War; Montenegro in the First World War*, Podgorica, 1998.

⁵⁶ Glas Crnogorca, Cetinje, Nr. 54, October 3, 1914.

- Lazić, Milan, *School conditions and the role of teachers in Herzegovina from 1878 to 1918*, Bileća, Gacko, Čorovićeви susreti, 2012, pp. 161–175.
- Mićanović, V, Šakotić, N; Vučković, D, Establishment and development of primary schooling and teacher education in Montenegro from the beginning of the 19th century to 1916, *Annales*, Ser. hist. sociol. 30, 2020, pp. 313–323.
- Mitrović, Andrej, *Serbia in the First World War*, Belgrade, 1984.
- Petrović, Milić, Austro-Hungarian occupation administration in Pljevlja during the First World War (1915–1918), Pljevlja, *Gazette of the Local Museum*, 2013, pp. 213–227.
- Pržić, Ilija, *Serbia's foreign policy (1804–1914)*, Belgrade, 1939.
- Radusinović, Pavle, *Population of Montenegro until 1945*, Belgrade, 1978.
- Rakočević, Novica, *Montenegro and Austria-Hungary 1903–1914*, Titograd 1983.
- Rakočević, Novica, The Situation on the Montenegrin-Turkish Border on the Eve of the Balkan War 1908–1912, *Istorijski zapisi* 3–4, 1962, pp. 485–515.
- Rakočević, Novica, Elections for the Montenegrin National Assembly in January 1914 and the program of the government of General Janko Vukotić, *Istorijski zapisi*, 3–4, 1972, pp. 413–430.
- Rakočević, Novica, Relations between Montenegro and Serbia 1903–1918, *Istorijski zapisi*, 3–4, 1984, pp. 89–104.
- Rakočević, Novica, *The time of Prince and King Nikola 1878–1918. year*, Belgrade, 2006.
- Rakočević, Novica, Relations between Austria-Hungary and Montenegro 1777–1914, *Istorijski zapisi*, 3–4, 1984, pp. 55–71.
- Rakočević, Novica, *Political relations between Montenegro and Serbia, 1903–1918*, Cetinje, 1981.
- Rakočević, Novica, *Military and political situation in Montenegro in 1914*, Mojkovac operation 1915–1916, Belgrade, 1997.
- Ratković, Slavica, Conflict between Italy and Montenegro over Shkodra in 1915, *Historical Records*, 1–2, 1974, pp. 95–122.
- Senjobas, Šarl, *Comparative history of European nations*, Belgrade, 1991.
- Stanojević, Stanoje, *History of the Serbian people*, Belgrade, 1926.
- Stojanović, Nikola, *Serbia and Yugoslav unification*, Belgrade, 1939.
- Svoljšak, P., Between two Fires, Austrian and Italian Political Violence in the Austrian Littoral 1914–1918. *Acta Histriae* 26, 2018, pp. 1003–1017.
- Škerović, Nikola, *Montenegro at the Dawn of the 20th Century*, Belgrade, 1964.
- Škerović, Nikola, *Montenegro during the First World War*, Titograd, 1963.
- Treadway, John, *Falcon and Eagle – Montenegro and Austria-Hungary 1908–1914*, Podgorica, 2005.
- Vojinović, Perko, *Montenegrin Intelligentsia (from the Half of the 18th Century to 1918)*, Niškić, 1989
- Vujović, Dimitrije, *Montenegrin Federalists 1919–1929*, Titograd, 1981.
- Zelenika, Milan, Battle on the Drina from September 6 to November 11, 1914, *Vojnoistorijski glasnik* 5, 1955, pp. 3–47.
- Živojinović, Dragoljub, *Allies (Russia, France, Britain) and Montenegro in the July Crisis of 1914, Parliamentarianism in Montenegro and Historical Roots and Development*, Podgorica, 1999.
- Živojinović, Dragoljub, Great Britain and Montenegro 1914–1918, *Historical Records*, 3–4, 1984, pp. 203–226.

POVZETEK

Pregled političnih, diplomatskih in družbenih razmer v Črni gori na predvečer prve svetovne vojne

Žarko Leković

Črnogorska vlada je bila v obdobju 1903-1914 izrazito protiavstrijsko usmerjena in se poskušala otresti gospodarske dominacije Avstro-Ogrske, ki si je na drugi strani na vse načine prizadevala poglobiti prepad med Srbijo in Črno goro in ohraniti srbski vpliv v Bosni in Hercegovini. Na predvečer prve svetovne vojne je Avstro-Ogrska anatemizirala Srbe.

Zaradi notranjih in zunanjih težav je začela črnogorska vlada govoriti o vprašanju zveze s Srbijo kot o edinem izhodu iz krize. Izkušnjo Črne gore v Balkanskih vojnah je jemala kot dokaz, da je skupna država rešitev za varnejšo prihodnost. V letu 1914 je Črna gora močno okrepila odnose s Srbijo, kar je prispevalo k povečanju njenega ugleda pri drugih južnoslovanskih narodih na zatiranih območjih.

Avstro-ogrski diplomacija in vojska sta zvezo Srbije in Črne gore razumeli kot neposredno grožnjo obstanku habsburške monarhije in sta si prizadevali, da z vsemi sredstvi, tudi vojno, preprečita združitev. Zato so bili odnosi med Črno goro in Avstro-Ogrsko leta 1914 v znamenju niza kriz in detanta, vsaka kriza pa se je zdela večja in nevarnejša od prejšnje.

V julijski krizi 1914 se je Črna gora znašla v izredno težkem položaju, čeprav ni bila izpostavljena obtožbam za umor avstro-ogrškega prestolonaslednika v Sarajevu. Bila je v globoki gospodarski krizi, njena vojska z zastarelo organizacijo ter slabim orožjem in opremo pa ni bila sposobna voditi sodobne vojne. Kljub velikim težavam je stala Črna gora trdno na strani Srbije. Avstro-Ogrske grožnje in nato napad na Srbijo so ljudje razumeli kot napad na Črno goro in srbski narod nasploh.

Mobilizacija črnogorske vojske in njene začetne operacije niso bile usklajene z operativnim načrtom srbske vojske, kar se je negativno odrazilo na bojišče. Zato je načelnik štaba vrhovnega poveljstva srbskega vojvode Radomirja Putnika 6. avgusta 1914 izdelal »skupni načrt delovanja srbske in črnogorske vojske v vojni proti Avstro-Ogrski«. V črnogorsko vrhovno poveljstvo so bili vključeni srbski oficirji, kar je prispevalo k večji učinkovitosti vojaških operacij v letu 1914.

ISSN 0350-5774



9 770350 577002



ZČ | Ljubljana | 78 | 2024 | št. 1-2 (169) | str. 1–262